



EMERGENCY IN MALAYA 1948-1960  - WHAT WAS 





The expansion of tin and rubber industries in Malaya resulted in an influx of Chinese and 
Indian immigrants. It was never thought by the British that the single society dominantly 
controlled by the Malays would be transformed into a multi-racial society. It was also never 
thought by the British, when it came to the period of decolonisation, that Malaya would face 
the greatest challenge with respect to nation building, compared to the other colonies.  
However, this view is debatable as it is believed by the Malays now that the British action was 
taken deliberately to fulfil the idea of colonialism. When the British claimed the need to retain 
the Malay status quo, they actually wanted to leave the Malays behind economically. At the 
same time, the foundation of a new plural society where previously a single community had 
dominated was a way to hold back any Malays struggle against the colonial power.1 It was 
clear the new ethnic diversity created tensions that were exacerbated by economic and 
political inequalities. 
This environment was conducive to the emergence of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).2 
The Communists sought to capitalise on the unrest, in order to fulfil their aim of creating a 
Communist Republic of Malaya. They terrorised the country and people of Malaya for twelve 
disastrous years, to achieve their great ambitions. It became the Communist insurrection 
which was one of the most important events in the history of Malaya under the British 
colonial rule. The insurrection was one of the toughest threats the British imperial power had 
ever faced in Malaya since 1824, when they officially started their colonisation of the Malay 
Peninsula. The insurrection, which resulted in  Emergency rule, was the first British 
communist struggle after the end of  the Second World War.  
 
One of the Malay states which experienced a severe threat from the MCP  was the State of 
Selangor. Selangor, together with Pahang, Perak, Johor and Negeri Sembilan, were among the 
worst affected places during the Emergency.  
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The State of Selangor was the most developed state in Malaya at that time. It was a very 
important place, as the British mainly run the administration of Malaya from Kuala Lumpur in 
Selangor. It was obvious that the MCP threat in Selangor was strongly related to the existence 
of  large numbers of Chinese in Selangor.  Kuala Lumpur had been founded by the Chinese 
and developed as the most important town in the Malay peninsula. Together with Kuala 
Lumpur, the Klang Valley developed and became the place where most Chinese immigrants  
lived.  
The existence of Chinese in such areas as Kuala Lumpur was significant to the existence of the 
Communist threat, since the vast majority of Communist members were Chinese.  
           The Terrorists were largely alien Chinese with  
                  no loyalty to Malaya  and the very few Malays  
                  and Indians among them attracted negligible support  
                  from their own people.3 
The emergency, by common consent, is considered to have started on 16 June 1948 in Sungei 
Siput and Ipoh in the state of Perak. It was then spread into several areas in Johore, namely 
Kluang, Muar, Kulai and Plentong. The next day, on the 17 June 1948, the emergency rule was 
declared for the whole area in the states of Perak and Johore. Finally, on the 18 June 1948, 
“The Proclamation of Emergency Rule” was declared by the British High Commissioner, Sir 
Edward Gent for every state in Malaya, including Selangor.4 Singapore was also declared the 
subject to emergency rule on the 24 June 1948.  
The High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, was killed in a tragic air incident while returning to 
London. He was replaced by Sir Henry Gurney on the 6 October 1948. Sir Henry Gurney 
decided that the Emergency was a struggle between ideologies. It was, therefore, a people’s 
war, and the people had to be won over and persuaded to make a stand for something very 
much better than communism. As a consequence, the army should continue to support the 
government and not take control of counter insurgency. Gurney declared that communism 
should be fought on two fronts: firstly by using weapons of social, economic and political 
progress, and secondly by the police force and the army.5  
Gurney began his war against the Communists with the master stroke of compulsory national 
registration, whereby every man, woman  and child aged twelve years or over had to possess 
an identity card bearing his or her name, photograph and fingerprint. By doing so the 
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government could then assume anyone without an identity card to be either a member of 
Min Yuen or a guerrilla.6  In this way, Gurney aimed to safegurad the real citizens of Malaya 
and at the same time monitor the movement of the Communist Terrorists (CTs).7 
Gurney also had not forgotten to encourage the Chinese to take a more active role and he 
tried to support and back the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) as an 
active agent on the side of the Government in its campaign against the MCP. This move was 
also important as an effort to convince the government and the Malays that all responsible 
Chinese were anti-Communist and willing to help in the resettlement project. It is quite clear 
that responsible Malays recognised the existence of a group of Chinese loyal to Malaya.8  
Among all the policies introduced by Sir Henry Gurney during the Emergency, the most 
important programme was the scheme to resettle squatters, though it was the most difficult 
to accomplish. The goal was finally achieved in early 1950 when Lieutenant General Sir Harold 
Rawdon Briggs was appointed as Director of Operations. He was charged solely with the 
prosecution of the Emergency and the coordination of efforts by the Security Forces with the 
civil administrators. Briggs came up with a scheme, subsequently known as the Briggs Plan. It 
was based mainly on the idea of resettlement first put forward by Sir Henry Gurney.9  
In the wake of his war against the Communist terror, Sir Henry Gurney was killed on 6 
October 1951 in an ambush by CTs, as he was travelling to Fraser Hill at the border of the 
State Selangor and Pahang. His successor was a military man who was granted by the British 
government an absolute power to end the insurgency. 
Sir Gerald Templer, unlike Gurney, was given full power by Churchill to ensure the end of 
insurgency in Malaya. He outlined his strategy to ensure the success of the new campaign 
against the communists. Firstly, the Police was to be reorganised and its role changed in 
emphasis ; secondly, a single improved intelligence organization had to be established and 
finally, the information services, including broadcasting and the production of films had to be 
coordinated and geared towards psychological warfare.10 
From the moment Templer took over as the new High Commissioner, the Malayan people 
were to hear again and again that war could only be won if their hearts and minds were won 
over to the government’s side. Due to that fact, he appointed Mr A.D.C Peterson , a school 
master, as Director General of Information, to coordinate the activities of the various 
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government departments concerned in the dissemination of information and to launch a 
psychological war against the Communists. As Templer saw it , “You have to make people 
understand what the government is trying to do before you can expect them to be on its 
side”.11  
The war to win over the hearts and minds of the people needed a serious effort and Templer 
indicated that he planned to make the campaign against the communists the responsibility of 
every single Malayan citizen. Gradually, he revealed his blueprint for social, economic and 
political progress. From the social point of view, he stressed the importance of a united 
Malayan nation which would mean a common citizenship for all races. This later resulted in a 
project to grant full citizenship to all aliens born in Malaya. Templer also tried to formalize 
cooperation between the Malays and the Chinese.12  
Templer also reacted to Lyttleton’s suggestion on the importance of education. Lyttleton’s 
idea was clearly stated in a Cabinet Memorandum, thus : 
                             Too many do not have a clear enough idea what 
                             they are fighting for. They must be taught, and  
                             one of the ways in which it can be done is by 
                             pressing forward with the project for compulsory 
                             primary education. It is not only the war of arms 
                             that must be won : education must help us to win 
                             the war of ideas. 
 
Therefore, he reorganised the education system and built schools within the new villages and 
developed projects for the benefit of the Malays.13         
Another important efforts by Templer was to establish a Federation Regiment (apart from the 
Malay Regiment) consisting of all races. It was eventually formed in December 1952 in 
Taiping. However the results were disappointing as it had a large preponderance of Malays 
and only a handful of Chinese, Indians and Eurasians.14  
 
Meanwhile, from the economic point of view, Templer had tried to raise the standard of living 
in kampongs (villages) and to improve facilities and amenities. Small economic projects, such 
                                                          
11
 Noel Barber, The War of The Running Dogs : How Malaya Defeated The Communist Guerillas, 1948 - 
1960. Glasgow ; William Calling Son and Co. Ltd., 1971, p.93 
12
 Gene Z Hanrahan,  The Communist Struggle in Malaya . Kuala Lumpur ; University of Malaya Press, 
1971, p.61 
13
 Ibid , Malaya  : The Communist Insurrection 1948 - 1953 (Part Two), p.334 
14





as village rice mills, were set up, cooperative agricultural schemes were established, and a 
good water supply and roads were constructed. Such developments and progress were 
needed because the new villages for the Chinese had already obtained such facilities. The 
government needed to win the trust of the Malays, as they had done in the case of the 
Chinese in the new villages.15 
From the political point of view, Templer, in his efforts to prepare the country for self-
government as well as to eradicate the communist threat, had supported  and tried to create 
necessary cooperation between the two main races, the Malays and Chinese, through the two 
important political parties UMNO and MCA. Then he introduced elections in municipal 
councils, as a first step. Elections to the eleven State and Settlement legislatures and 
ultimately the Federal Legislative Council itself were to follow, with self- government and 
eventually independence as the ultimate goals.16  
The Security Forces in 1953 had widened and reorganized their programme to resettle the 
aborigines in the jungle by the establishment of jungle forts. This was important to win the 
hearts and minds of the aborigines. The support of the aborigines was needed after some  
military operations found that the MCP had forced the aborigines into supplying them with 
food. This was because the supplies from the Chinese who were now completely guarded and 
under the control of Government forces under the New Villages programme, were completely 
cut off. Many jungle forts  with some facilities such as medical and health centres were built 
to ensure that the MCP would not have any chance to use the aborigines to help their military 
struggle.17    
It was a great challenge for the British to put down the insurrection and stop the spread of 
Communism, while at the same time having to prepare the multi-racial society founded by 
the British pre-war policy  for self government. One of the most important states in Malaya, 
which was badly affected by the Communist terror, was Selangor, one of the key states, not 
least on account of its advanced development. Countering the communist insurrection was a 
great challenge to the British administration in Malaya. It took the efforts of four High 
Commissioners, together with the British Government’s assurances of military aid, to put 
down the Communist struggle, thereby paving the way for independence.  
 
In the case of Selangor, it was ironic that at the same time the state was experiencing the 
heavy attack from the MCP, Selangor was also seen as the most important place to counter 
the insurgents. Unlike the other states, Selangor was recognised for its importance as the 
centre of British administration. Most policy came out of the administration headquarters in 
Kuala Lumpur, which was Selangor’s capital at that time. However, this was not the only or 
most significant role of Selangor during the emergency period. It was also in Selangor that the 
British started to attack  the MCP politically. 
This was done not by means of military attack, but by psychological attack through the plural 
society relation test. In a country where multi-racial relations was a key issue, the test of this 
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aspect could not be put aside. From a country dominated by a single society, Malaya had 
been transformed into a plural society. Selangor became the most suitable place to test the 
viability of pluralism due to the fact that it was Selangor in which the Chinese had 
concentrated since the early migration of foreigners to Malaya. The multi- racial description 
of Malaya could be translated through the condition of a plural society existing in Selangor. 18  
The most influential political attack by which to test and measure relations in Malaya at that 
time was the elections. Selangor was not the first state in which an election was held, but 
Selangor was the first where such a test of relations really counted. The role of the elections 
has, however, been neglected by many previous researchers as the most important factor 
that clear the path for the success of counter insurgency and, at the same time, as the reason 
for  Malayan independence in 1957. 
One unique  fact about Malaya is that its history of independence is always known as the 
story inside the story. The history of Malayan independence is always overshadowed by the 
uprising and terrors created by the MCP.  The story of the emergency and independence has 
always been related to the success of the British in their strategy to defeat the MCP during 
the peak of the Cold war. However, one of the important questions related to the emergency 
is, at what time did it become clear that everything was going to work succesfully ?. What was 
the turning point of the story ?. Most scholars clearly pointing to the Templer’s day. However 
it is interesting that little research has considered the role of the election as one of the 
important factors  that cleared the path for both, the end of the emergency and 
independence. The election had several important features which were vital to the British 
government to end the MCP insurgency and the Emergency itself. Some of these were ; 
Firstly, the election was a great tool by which the people of Malaya started to create a 
relationship which had never before existed. A commercial relationship can be identified, but 
genuine racial harmony had  never existed, especially after the Second World War, when the 
MCP gained influence among the Chinese. As Cheah Boon Kheng described it : 
                           Stories of the lack of respect shown by such Chinese 
                           -mostly MCP- towards Malay custom and religion  
                           increased hostility towards the Chinese.When Malays 
                           saw these actions they failed to distinguish between 
                           Chinese Communists and non communists.19 
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The elections clearly created a good base to improve race relations among the Malaya people.  
   
Secondly, the election at the same time was also a great way for the British government to 
measure the strength of the support they would receive from the Malayan people to fight the 
MCP insurgency. The support from all races was vital. As an example, Gurney had not 
forgotten to try to encourage the Chinese to take a more active role and he tried to support 
and back the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) as an active agent on the 
side of the Government in its campaign against MCP. Similarly, Templer, in his  efforts to 
prepare the  country for self-government in the future, as well as, to eradicate the 
communist threat, had supported and tried to create necessary cooperation between the two 
main races, the Malays and Chinese, through the two important political parties, UMNO and 
MCA. He instigated elections to municipal councils as a first step.  
Thirdly, elections were a great opportunity for the Malayan people to prepare an 
administration which represented themselves. Elections are one of the important criteria to 
demonstrate democracy.It is  important to determine the leadership and the use of political 
power. It is a vehicle that gives public opinion a very important place in running the 
administration of the country. Thus, elections have a powerful significance to every 
democratic country in the world. They give a clear measure of the strength of  public support 
for any policy introduced by any government. Holding elections is the best way for the people 
to express their opinion and also the best way for the government to measure the 
effectiveness of their policy and administration.  
 
Finally, it is also interesting that the elections indirectly highlighted the role of Malayan leader 
whether Malay, Chinese or Indian in freeing the country from terrorists and the colonial 
power. On this occasion Gurney was already discussing with the Colonial Office the question 
of  local elections as well as the devolution of greater political responsibility to the 
Malayan political elite.20 
Basically, much research has been done on Malaya and the emergency. It can be classified 
into several types. One common type is the general description of emergency, referring to the 
overall situation of the campaign. Another is  strategic analysis, such as has been undertaken 
by many ex-servicemen or  people involved in the campaign. There are also studies which 
discuss the Malayan Communist Party in detail. A fourth type is detailed analysis on the 
emergency from the perspective of a selected topic.  
In general, in all these types  of research and writing, it is rare to find a detailed analysis of the 
emergency in a particular Malay state. It is also difficult to find detailed research on a 
particular state in Malaya which at the same time reflects the importance of the state in 
relation to certain important events, such as elections or alliance, or even independence. 
Municipal elections were held in many states in Malaya, such as Penang, Johore and Perak, 
but it was Selangor that showed the siginificance of multi racial relations. It was shown in the 
Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election 1952, how the various ethnic communities could be united 
through understanding and cooperation for the sake of the country. This phenomenon 
stimulated the formation of the Alliance Party of United Malayan Nations Organization 
(UMNO), The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in 
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advance of the general election 1955, which opened the path for the independence of 
Malaya. This cooperation among the majority races was  vital to the British government’s  
plan to end the MCP revolt. 
A few small sudies have been done referring to particular states, but no comprehensive study 
of the emergency in one state. Generally, previous research has been on a small scale, 
confined to a single aspect such as the economic, political or social.21 In the case of Selangor, 
also, it is rare to  find the study on the emergency that refers to Selangor as a whole and 
touch every aspect.22 Basically, most of the written accounts on the emergency are at the 
level of Malaya as a whole. Also, most of the written accounts either directly or indirectly 
praise the Templer period as a significant time when the communist insurrection was slowed 
down.  
Therefore, it is clear that most of the previous accounts of the emergency did not highlight 
the importance of elections. The nearest suggestion comes from  Victor Purcell which clearly 
claimed that main success against the Communists was, in fact won before Templer’s 
arrival.23 Victor Purcell was among the scholars who have not accepted the Templer factor  as 
the most vital reason for the Communists defeat. Purcell commented on Templer’s day as 
reviving the obsolete and bankrupt policy of divide and rule instead of healing the differences 
between the Chinese and Malays.24  Purcell’s view is shared by some other researchers and 
writers. His idea is supported by Karl Hack where he points out in his articles that the turning 
points of the events was not after the arrival of Templer when he combined the posts of High 
Commissioner and Director of Operations but it happen before 1952, the year he arrived. 
Hack focuses on the suggestion of “population control” which  was introduced during the 
Briggs Plan under the Gurney administration, arguing that it was  the most vital means in 
ending the emergency.25 In addition Joseph M Fernando clearly highlighted Gurney concern 
which refers to the use of political strategy together with military means to end the MCP’s 
struggles. On this occasion Gurney was the man who approach two-pronged political 
advancement for Malaya. Through local elections Gurney hoped to create greater political 
awareness and participation of population at the lower levels, while, through the ‘1951 
Member System’, would have acquired sufficient experience in government administration to 
eventually enable a smooth transfer of power. Gurney hoped that his plan would satisfy the 
public demands for democratic as opposed to communists methods of terror. In giving local 
politicians more political power, Gurney saw a possible trump card against MCP’s claim to 
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legitimacy in its violent campaign for self government as his plans would indicate positive 
steps towards self government.26  
  
Different from the above mentioned writers, Noel Barber underlined the significance of the 
year 1955. And like others, Barber hailed the Templer period as an important period in the 
counterinsurgency, but he did not identify it as a turning point. Barber asserted that 1955 was 
the most siginificant year in the emergency, and he pointed out the general elections as an 
important factor which turn the bullet struggle against the Communism into a ballot attack.27 
Even though Barber did not explicitly identify the election as the turning point, his emphasis 
on 1955 as a significant year could be interpreted as implying the significance of the elections 
as a turning point for the country and the insurgency. This was brought out especially when 
the elections cleared the path for the  landslide victory by the Alliance party which provided a 
strong pre-self administration of the Malayan people before independence. 
Meanwhile John Gullick pointed out to the Templer period of 1952-54 as an important period 
which led to changes in the country’s progress towards independence, as he indicated that 
after 1954, the main phase of the emergency had passed.28 However, what is interesting is 
that he also highlighted that the municipal elections had quickened the tempo of Malayan 
politics, especially towards independence29. His view was is by Stubbs, who pointed to the 
introduction of elections, especially the 1952 elections, as the turning point in the 
development of both the UMNO and MCA, which predominantly represented the Malays and 
Chinese in Malaya.30 Although, neither pointed directly to that period as a turning point in 
Malayan history towards the end of emergency or independence, their work is important in 
recognising the role played by multi racial relations  as a vital element in the success of any 
programme to end the emergency.  
Another study which also shares the view that the end of the emergency was not solely 
influenced by the Templer period was by Rayner, who had worked in the coal mine in Batu 
Arang, Selangor and also was an ex servicemen of the British forces. This experience gave him 
a different perspective from other writers such as Short and Clutterbuck, who were 
researchers and received their information from the government. He did not suggest any 
particular turning point, but he was reluctance to accept the idea that Templer was the sole 
important factor that ended the communist terror and emergency. Based on his experience 
and knowledge, he suggested that the weaknesses of MCP was the true reason for its failure. 
He questioned the credibility of Chin Peng in the eyes of Malayan people, compared to that of 
Ho Chi Minh for the Vietnamese people, and asserted that these weaknesses finally ended 
the emergency. 31 Aloysius Chin, also, suggested that the weaknesses of the MCP was in all 
likelihood the main factor, rather than British counterinsurgency strategy and policy.32 It 
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should be remembered however, that, Rayner’s account is based on personal experience 
rather than academic study. 
It has been seen that previous research has examined British policy in countering insurgency 
in Malaya as a whole. However not much research and work has been done on the  
emergency for a particular state such as Selangor. Many previous studies on Selangor focus 
on a specific topic but do not cover the overall situation. Therefore, this study is intended to 
explore the importance of Selangor during the emergency. The focus of the study will be on 
important aspects of the emergency in Selangor, especially the role of the Municipal Election 
1952 and General Election 1955, in gaining an understanding of multi-racial relations in 
Malaya. The study will argue that the election was the key turning point in Malayan history 
which slowed down the insurrection and created a path for the independence in 1957. 
 
Conclusion 
The armed insurrection by the MCP undeniably was the hardest test for the British 
Government in Malaya challenging the communism ideology. It was the Cold War and the 
new world of Bipolar Power. Many factors can be enumerated to explain the success of the 
counterinsurgent forces in Malaya. However, one important questions related to the 
emergency is, at what time did it become clear that everything was going to work succesfully 
?. What was the turning point of the story ?. The debate has long been discussed and 
provided many suggestion. The Templer role especially his hearts and minds approach had 
been highlighted by Barber, Smith, Short, Hanrahan, Jackson and many other accounts. 
Templer role was never denied as important to the counterinsurgency but for some account 
his approach was criticized as unsuitable and for some it was never accepted as the turning 
point of the event in Malaya at that time. However, there was also other factors which came 
into account as important to end the emergency as suggested by Smith such as election. 
Although the election not came as big part as hearts and minds or population control but it 
was undeniably the most important moment the Malaya population realized on their own 
situation. It was the moment the breakthrough on the racial relationship was founded when 
UMNO and MCA informally cooperated in Kuala Lumpur Municipal election. It was also the 
moment where the MCP politically stabbed deeply into their struggle as the Malayan strongly 
supported the election and the multi racial relation experiment of UMNO-MCA, and rejected 
the terrorist struggle by the MCP. Importantly this vital moment of understanding and 
cooperation was founded by a group of local leaders in Kuala Lumpur Selangor which later 
became a model to larger scale of cooperation among races in Malaya. Therefore, the 
significant role of election firstly founded in Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election between 
Selangor UMNO and Selangor MCA was undeniably stood as important as other factor and 
was a moment that turn the history of the emergency in Malaya.  The importance brought by 
the election lied on the government realization that counter-measures would be effective as 
long as the population were with the government. The great differences in religion, social life, 
politics and economics made it clear and impossible for the multi-ethnic society to accept 
each other. The hard work and confidence grown among the local leaders , brought the 
cooperation and compromise to break the segmentation and gain the acceptation of the 
people on the reality of a plural society in Malaya. On 31 December 1957, Malaya became an 
independent country.  
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